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The Headwaters
Agreement:
A History, Summary
and Critique'
I. Introduction
On March 1, 1999, minutes before the midnight
deadline, the interested parties reached an agreement
that attempts to seal the fate of the much-acclaimed
Headwaters Forest in Humboldt County, California.
The Headwaters Agreement, constituting several thou-
sand pages of documents, was signed by representa-
tives of Pacific Lumber Companies (Pacific Lumber),
the National Marine Fisheries Service INMFS), the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWSJ, the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the California
Resources Agency Iwhich oversees the California
Department of Fish and Game JDFG) and California
Department of Forestry JCDFJ) and the California
Wildlife Conservation Board (WCB), among others- The
Agreement was made up of several different compo-
nents, including state and federal funding, a Habitat
Conservation/Sustained Yield Plan IHCP/SYP) and
deeds for property and other interests in land such as
easements, All parties likely agree it is a complicated
and lengthy agreement That, however, may be where
the accord ends
While the agreement clarifies many aspects of the
management of nearly 220,000 thousand acres of bio-
logically critical forest owned by Palcific Lumber, the
merits of the Agreement are interpreted very different-
ly by various interest groups The clearest positive
aspect of the Agreement is that about 7500 acres of
partially virgin old-growth forest is now in state and
federal ownership and will be protected from all log-
ging, The timber management aspects of the
Agreement for the rest of Pacific Lumber's land are,
however, unlikely to end what has come to be known as
the "Timber Wars" This commentary explains the his-
tory leading up to the Agreement and its basic compo-
nents It then points out some of the more contentious
areas of the Agreement
11. History of the Headwaters Agreement
In 1985, Charles Hurwitz, president of Maxxam Inc
of Houston, acquired Pacific Lumber from the Murphy
family for S900 million in a hostile takeover using junk
bonds Prior to the takeover by Maxxam, Pacific
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Lumber managed its forest lands for eighty
years with progressive conservation policies.
As a result, areas of old-growth and mature
second-growth forests that had become
extremely rare, remained on Pacific Lumber
land. Pacific Lumber harvested no more red-
wood in any year than it grew and did little
clearcutting, thus leaving 40 to 50 percent of
trees standing to protect soil erosion and pro-
mote new growth.
After the takeover, Pacific Lumber tripled
its old growth logging in order to pay off the
junk bonds. Beginning in 1987, The
Environmental Protection Information Center
(EPIC) and several other environmental groups
successfully sued Maxxam and obtained
injunctions temporarily protecting the remain-
ing virgin groves of Headwaters Forest pur-
suant to Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohi-
bitions. Despite this victory, over 40,000 acres
of old-growth redwoods have been leveled
since the takeover at a market price of around
$100,000 per tree.
In 1990, the battle over the redwoods con-
tinued. The "Forests Forever" initiative, which
would have provided for the acquisition of
Headwaters Forest and reformed logging prac-
tices across the State failed by a narrow margin
in the June election. Soon after, thousands of
citizens from across the country protested
Maxxam's timber management practices. The
so-called "Redwood Summer" included march-
es and occupations of threatened groves, and
was covered by the national and international
press. Public support for protection of the
Headwaters Forest increased as citizens across
the nation learned of the situation.
Following nearly a decade of public
protest, litigation and grassroots organizing,
state and federal officials reached an agree-
ment with Pacific Lumber and Maxxam on
September 28, 1996, to permanently protect
part of Headwaters Forest. United States
Senator Dianne Feinstein, Deputy Interior
Secretary John Garamendi, State Resources
Secretary Douglas Wheeler and Charles
Hurwitz announced an agreement to acquire
7470 acres of Headwaters Forest for cash and
land valued at $380 million. Among the deal's
contingencies were approval of a HCP for the
rest of Pacific Lumber's land, issuance of a per-
mit to take endangered species and destroy
their habitat, and a promise that Pacific
Lumber would drop their Fifth Amendment
"takings" claim against the government.
Grassroots opposition to the agreement
arose in response to both the purchase and its
conditions. Critics pointed out that only a por-
tion of the forest would be brought under per-
manent protection through the agreement, at a
cost far beyond the value of the timber that
could be legally taken from the property given
ESA and other regulatory restrictions.
Conservationists perceived the high purchase
price as effectively a settlement of the "takings"
claims against the state and federal govern-
ments, which according to many legal experts,
had very little chance of succeeding on their
merits. This tactic, in effect, extorts a high pur-
chase price from a public increasingly con-
cerned about loss of wild and cpen spaces,
though the claim ignores the decrease in value
due to environmental restrictions. Many feared
that other corporations, following Maxxam's
lead, would use similarly spurious "takings"
threats to essentially hold endangered species
and their habitats hostage.
The HCP, however, sparked the most wide-
spread opposition. The use of HCPs, central
features of the 1982 ESA amendment package
permitting landowners to legally "take" or kill
protected species and destroy their habitats,
had spread rapidly across the United States
under the Clinton Administiation The
Administration's "No Surprises" policy essen-
tially locked these long-term plars into place
for decades by shielding landowners from any
additional conservation, or "mitigation" com-
mitments once the plans were approved.
Critics complained that the new p ans increas-
ingly lacked scientific credibility even as they
grew to encompass larger parcels and multiple
endangered and threatened species
On November 14, 1997, President Clinton
signed appropriations legislation securing
$250 million for the federal share of the
Headwaters Forest purchase. The bill specified
that appropriation of California's share of the
purchase, the HCP and the dismissal of Pacific
Lumber's "takings" claim be completed by
S-na 1999.
March 1. 1999. or authorization for the federal
money would expire. Responding to the feder-
al appropriation legislation, the California
Legislature offered an additional $100 million
to acquire about 2000 more acres of redwoods.
bringing the total purchase price up to $480
million. In the spring of 1998, Senator
Feinstein and Deputy Interior Secretary
Garamendi brokered a deal with Hurwitz for
$480 million in exchange for a total of 10,000
acres of Pacific Lumber forestlands in. Both the
original acquisition and the later additions are
composed of less that one half old-growth, the
remainder being clearcut and second-growth
stands. The HCP settlement allows logging
across 210,000 acres in Humboldt County to
proceed even if it results in the death of endan-
gered species and the destruction of their habi-
tat. The SYP determines harvest levels on the
property for the next twelve decades; logging
will be especially intense during the first decade,
then fall off considerably for fifty to sixty years
during which time the depleted landscape is
expected to regenerate.
Three days before the March 1 deadline,
directors of Pacific Lumber and its parent,
Maxxam, rejected the deal. Hurwitz said that he
would not go through with the deal unless the
Federal Government allowed larger timber cuts.
Negotiations continued until minutes before the
midnight deadline. A settlement was reached
whereby Pacific Lumber was allowed an addi-
tional forty-five million board feet per year to
meet projected profitability, but no language
was actually changed.
IllI. Summary of the Headwaters Agreement
The key provisions of the Headwaters
Agreement are:
e Pacific Lumber and its parent firm, the
Houston based Maxxam Inc., are paid $380 mil-
lion by the federal and state governments for the
purchase of the Headwaters Forest. An addition-
al $100 million will be paid over the next five
years for two additional ancient redwood groves.
• Ownership of the 7500-acre Headwaters
Forest, consisting of a 3000-acre tract of virgin
timber and a 4500-acre buffer zone that has
experienced some logging, and two smaller
groves comprising 2500-acres is transferred
immediately to the public, to be co-managed by
BLM and the State as a protected preserve.
Limited public access will be available from
Highway 101
o Pacific Lumber agrees to a new HCP cov-
ering timber harvesting and wildlife protection
measures through the year 2049 on the other
211,000 acres of its timber land-
* The HCP bans logging for fifty years in
twelve so-called "lesser" cathedral groves, con-
stituting about 8000 acres to protect the nesting
territory of endangered marbled murrelets, but
allows quick liquidation of another 9000 acres of
old-growth and -residual" redwood forest that
provides habitat for these threatened seabirds
e Other no-logging areas include buffer
zones on all year-round and intermittent
streams to protect threatened coho salmon.
* Environmental safeguards remain in
place even if the property is sold.
IV. Critique of the Headwaters Agreement
The HCP/SYP prepared by Pacific Lumber
and government negotiators proved by far the
most contentious components of the controver-
sial Headwaters Agreement. The two-year
odyssey of the completion of these plans trav-
eled the rough waters between biological reality
and hardball politics At each point where state
and federal biologists angered Pacific Lumber
with demands for stronger habitat protection,
powerful politicians stepped in and crafted com-
promises, usually at the expense of fish and
wildlife protection. At journey's end, the plans
proved maddeningly complex, riddled with
loopholes, and of dubious overall scientific
merit.
Whatever their flaws, the plans are now
approved. While conservationists explore vari-
ous legal remedies, politicians are loudly pro-
claiming that these plans become the keystones
of a new model for forestry in the Redwood
Region and the Pacific Northwest, In this con-
text. understanding both the underlying frame-
work and various problems of these plans is cru-
cial,
The HCP/SYP combines a federal applica-
tion for a permit to "take" endangered species
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with a state level long-term logging plan. Thus,
its provisions ate explicitly designed to result in
a net decrease in the number of endangered
species on the property and the habitat avail-
able for their survival and recovery.
In order to receive such a permit, Pacific
Lumber had to outline various measures to
"mitigate and minimize" the impacts of habitat
destruction and outright killing on the various
populations of threatened fish and wildlife in
the plan area. Although a total of seventeen
species can be legally killed under the plan, mit-
igation measures were developed with only six
"focus" species in mind: the Northern spotted
owl, the marbled murrelet and four species of
fish including coho salmon and steelhead trout.
The other eleven species include amphibians,
mammals, birds and one reptile that are expect-
ed to subsist on the protection offered the six
higher-profile creatures.
The Northern spotted owl and various other
species must depend largely on the mainte-
nance of "habitat diversity" across the land-
scape. This is a euphemism for the patchwork of
clearcuts and even-age plantations that will
soon replace the diverse mature and ancient
forests open for logging under the plan.
Although a minimum number of spotted owl
"activity centers" must exist during any one year,
no ancient forest habitat is set aside specifical-
ly for the owl or the other forest creatures
dependent on such areas.
Depending on the final determinations of
"watershed analysis" teams, there will be rough-
ly 9000 acres of ancient and residual Douglas
fir/hardwood forest made available for logging.
Only a few hundred acres of this increasingly
rare forest type will be "set aside" for the fifty-
year life of the plan. These forests are home to
many rare mammals including the Pacific fisher
and quite possibly the extremely rare Humboldt
marten. Their irrevocable loss will hamper
efforts to study and protect these and other
wildlife.
Marbled murrelets nest only in the upper
limbs of coastal old-growth trees, and have
been detected in numerous areas on Pacific
Lumber land. Indeed, federal officials found the
company's remaining old growth so important
that they designated much of it "critical habitat"
for the murrelet. Under this plan, however, more
than 450 acres of uncut ancient redwoods and
8300 acres of residual redwoods will be logged.
Logging in these areas, many of which have not
yet been surveyed for murrelet occupancy, will
proceed without any further study. Logging
operations will be conducted during the mur-
relet breeding season (April-September) on half
of this acreage, increasing the chances that
nesting birds will be killed and their eggs
destroyed.
The "mitigation" for this logging activity In
murrelet habitat involves twelve "Marbled
Murrelet Conservation Areas" that will be "set
aside" for fifty years. These areas total 7728
acres, but contain only 1446 acres of old growth
and 2700 acres of residual redwood forest.
Company and agency officials insist that the
local population will not suffer from the pro-
jected loss of at least 240 to 351 birds, but
prominent murrelet experts remain skeptical.
Especially questionable is the fact that much of
the habitat loss will occur in unsuiveyed areas,
and that the true impact on the local popula-
tion may never be known.
Temporary measures for coho and chinook
salmon, as well as steelhead and coastal cut-
throat trout, include buffer zones of varying
widths on streams flowing within the company's
property. Logging operations on geologically
sensitive areas like active landslides and steep
"inner gorge" slopes next to streams (so-called
"Mass Wasting Areas of Concern") are also
restricted. Buffers on fish-bearing (Class I)
streams span 170 feet with a 100-foot "no-cut"
band next to the stream. Buffer zones along
smaller year-round (Class ii) streams are 130
feet wide, with an inner "no-cut" buffer of 30
feet. The outer portion of these zones will be
open to "selection" logging.
The steep, seasonal (Class 111) streams on
the upper slopes of coastal watersheds became
a focal point of contention in the scientific
debate over the HCR Because these streams are
generally highly erodable and deliver sediment
directly to fish-bearing and amphibian-support-
ing stream reaches below, many prominent sci-
entists encouraged their protection. Pacific
Lumber strongly objected, due to the extensive
area that would be covered by buffer zones on
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these streams. In the end, a compromise was
reached: thirty-foot no cut buffers inside a wider
zone where heavy equipment use is not allowed.
except for about 2200 acres that can be
"thinned" during the first five years of the plan in
the outer twenty feet of the buffer zone.
During the last frenzied moments of negoti-
ation over the HCP/SYP, however, it appears that
federal officials made major concessions to the
company. First, an "adaptive management"
process was inserted in the HCP, allowing the
company to propose changes to aquatics con-
servation measures at anytime. As a practical
matter, any change proposed by the company
will weaken rather than increase aquatic protec-
tion. Second, last minute adjustments to the
SYP increased allowable logging levels by more
than 30 percent. Although government officials
continue to insist that no actual changes to the
language of the Agreement were made, Pacific
Lumber recently announced that it has permis-
sion to immediately log seasonal buffer zones
and geologically unstable areas throughout the
property.
All of these buffer zones, and the logging
restrictions on unstable areas, can be modified
through an ill-defined "watershed analysis"
process. Teams of Pacific Lumber and agency
officials will visit each watershed on the compa-
ny's land during the next five years in order to
develop site-specific logging prescriptions that
will remain in place for the remaining forty-five
year life of the plan. The "watershed analysis
modules" are not described in the HCP.
Minimum and maximum restrictions are placed
on the results, and agency officials make the
final determination as to how much logging will
be allowed.
Most of the temporary protection measures
fall far short of the recommendations of top sci-
entists. Furthermore, the adaptive management
and watershed analysis process will most likely
lead to decreased protection for fish and wildlife
over the coming years. This HCP/SYP illustrates
the importance of continued citizen monitoring
and involvement. In the opinion of conserva-
tionists, legal action will be required to obtain
adequate protection for native fish and wildlife.
V. Conclusion
The Headwaters Agreement is a step for-
ward in the debate over the management of pri-
vately owned old-growth forests in general, and
Pacific Lumber lands, in particular For better or
for worse, it will serve as a model for future
agreements and it creates some certainty for
the fate of the Headwaters Forest and sur-
rounding Pacific Lumber lands The debate,
however, over the extent of ESA protections,
the adequacy of forest management practices
and the correct degree of social responsibility
required of private landowners will certainly
continue. In fact. on March 31, 1999. the Sierra
Club and EPIC filed suit against CDF and DFG
in state court challenging the approval of
Pacific Lumbers SYP and state incidental -take"
permits for logging operations on land includ-
ed in the Headwaters Agreement Additionally,
a case filed by EPIC in federal court is pending
against Pacific Lumber for logging that
occurred in endangered species' habitat during
the Headwaters Agreement negotiations. The
complaint alleges that Pacific Lumber violated
the consultation provisions of the ESA (section
7(d)) by irretrievably committing resources
(logging) in a manner precluding reasonable
and prudent alternatives In the coming years,
the aftermath of this new generation of envi-
ronmental dealmaking between public and pri-
vate entities will be interesting to observe
Hastings %Vest-Northwest welcomes your
comments and/or articles pertaining to the
Headwaters Agreement For further information
about the Headwaters Agreement or to find out
how you can become involved, contact
The Environmental Protection
Information Center
PO Box 397
Garberville, CA 95542
(707) 923-2931
Fax: (707)923-4210
epic@igc-org
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